

C⁴ISR Imperatives—Cornerstones of a Network-Centric Architecture

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INTRODUCTION

Network-centric operations have been the focus of serious discussion over the past several years, especially following the wide exposure provided by Admiral Cebrowski's 1998 *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* article [1]. Here we take the view that network-centric operations are military operations that fully exploit the availability of "universal" connectivity. Such connectivity can lead to:

- Widespread access to heretofore isolated resources (people, machines, data)
- Improved access to specialized information that has, in the past, been difficult to locate
- Accelerated planning processes
- Introduction of a new dimension to "contact" between opposing forces—cyber contact
- Innovative uses of information
- Development of entirely new ways to work and to think about tasks
- Emergent operational concepts and organizational structures
- Et cetera—think, for example, about emerging Web services and Web uses for personal or business reasons

There will no doubt be many innovative applications for the future network as we build toward network-centric operations. Much discussion of network-centric operations focuses on envisioning these future applications—most of which have not yet been invented. These applications are a confederation of pieces, not a single unit. In fact, that is an intention—the ability to evolve and adapt through "parts upgrade," without having to replace an entire system. The prerequisite for fielding these pieces is an in-place network-centric architecture that can support their implementation. And as is the case with the Web, applications follow infrastructure. Make access simple and widespread, make providing content relatively easy, and someone invents eBay. In this view, "network-centric architecture" provides ubiquitous and universal, timely and "useful" access.

IMPERATIVES FOR C⁴ISR

SSC San Diego has identified a set of seven command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C⁴ISR) imperatives. These imperatives represent command capabilities that have

ABSTRACT

Network-centric operations are military operations that fully exploit the availability of "universal" connectivity. Much discussion of network-centric operations focuses on envisioning future applications of the connectivity. These future applications are a confederation of pieces, not a single unit. The prerequisite for fielding these pieces is an in-place network-centric architecture that can support their implementation. SSC San Diego has identified seven command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C⁴ISR) imperatives that represent command capabilities needed by military forces. Network-centric architecture requires effectively achieving five of these imperatives. This paper argues the importance of these five, and suggests the value of building technologies to enable these imperatives. This approach allows clearer understanding of the application of technology while assuring consistency with the end objective of network-centric operations.

been needed by military forces throughout history and are expected to continue to be needed in the future. While the imperatives are time-independent, the degree to which they can be achieved depends upon available technology.

Dynamic Interoperable Connectivity will provide assured, user-transparent connectivity, on demand, to any desired locations in the "infosphere"—the worldwide grid of people, sensors, military databases, fusion nodes, national resources, and commercial and other non-U.S. information resources.

Universal Information Access will use that connectivity to access strategically located sensors, database servers, and anchor desks. It will provide users, at all levels, with the key information needed to create and share a consistent perception of the operational situation.

Focused Sensing and Data Collection provides the warfighter with the ability to acquire the information needed to allow viewing an area of interest or responsibility at any desired level of fidelity and resolution.

Achieving *Consistent Situation Representation* is the fourth imperative. When all key operational commanders have a consistent situation understanding, tools supporting the fifth imperative, *Distributed Collaboration*, can be used to work effectively together across space and time to plan and execute missions and tasks.

The sixth imperative, *Information Operations–Assurance*, will protect our information and our C⁴ISR infrastructure.

Finally, *Resource Planning and Management* provides the mechanisms for effective use of all available resources.

Implementing a network-centric architecture requires effectively achieving several of these imperatives.

NETWORK-CENTRIC ARCHITECTURE

The concept of "ubiquitous and universal, timely and 'useful' access" needs some discussion. The first point we should make is that "access" does not equal information access, which we will discuss later as the imperative for Universal Information Access. In the network-centric architecture, access implies the ability to establish relationships among users. Those relationships must support the users' timeliness requirements. The users might be people, or processes running on machines. Examples of access might be one person phoning another, a person querying a database, a person launching a software process such as an intelligent agent search, a machine process seeking the right human consumer(s) of its information, a sensor establishing relationships with other sensors to triangulate or refine a detection, or a weapon linking to a sensor for guidance purposes.

Some characteristics of the architecture include:

- "Universal" suggests that connectivity must reach everywhere of interest. ("Of interest" is situation dependent.)
- "Ubiquitous" suggests that everything of interest must "plug in" to the connectivity. Plugging in implies some ability to interact with other plugged-in entities under some rules or circumstances—such as appropriate security.
- This "pluggability" implies standards or translators/gateways.

- Where needed access does not exist, it must be "createable" through means such as sensor deployment or establishing connectivity.

Perhaps most importantly, we need to consider "usefulness." We use the term to collectively represent a broad set of attributes that the architecture should support. First, the implementation should be user-centric and intuitive. That is, the implementations should focus on the needs and requirements of users at all operational levels of command, and support those needs in a way that minimizes reliance on specialized skills and training in the use of the architecture elements. The architecture must be adaptable and configurable. These characteristics suggest that the capabilities supported by the architecture will be totally responsive to the user's unique requirements for information to support specific missions, tasks, or functions. Finally, the architecture must be survivable in the face of all types of physical, electronic, or cyber effects, to the same degree that the user and user's physical space are survivable.

With this view, the imperatives Dynamic Interoperable Connectivity, Universal Information Access, and Focused Sensing and Data Collection apply to the architecture directly. The imperative Information Operations–Assurance and the imperative Resource Planning and Management also apply, but in the limited sense of assuring and managing connectivity and access. The Consistent Situation Representation and the Distributed Collaboration imperatives are really customers or applications that utilize the network-centric architecture rather than being fundamental elements of the architecture.

DYNAMIC INTEROPERABLE CONNECTIVITY

Dynamic Interoperable Connectivity is the conduit for all data and information, whether that information moves 15 feet or 15,000 miles. The Dynamic Interoperable Connectivity imperative aims to ensure that the warfighter has reliable and secure access to all needed information.

Providing worldwide Universal Information Access requires an integrated global network for gathering and exchanging information. This includes extensive high-capacity landline connections among military users to maintain extensive databases from which warfighters may "pull." It also requires improved in-theater communications for better response to the warfighter's needs, particularly the dynamic movement of imagery and large files.

Not all connectivity users are people. Machines also must exchange data. Connectivity supporting machine data exchange has been accepted Navy practice for the four decades since the introduction of the Naval Tactical Data System and Link-11. Connectivity can involve any number of people and machines, in various locations, as required to accomplish a task. In the future, machines as users must be able to control connectivity on a priority basis.

Dynamic connectivity is flexible, supporting the time-varying needs of users. But it is also economic, supporting the sharing of resources. This allows a given set of resources to serve many times the needs that could be supported by static connections. In addition, individual users generally perform many functions and belong to multiple user communities associated with those functions. The functions may each require only part-time involvement. Connectivity requirements will then track the shifting task involvements.

The future warfighter must have full access to his/her real and virtual area of responsibility, or "operational space." The operational space may be physically small, or global, depending on the user's role. The operational space may be functionally restricted or extend beyond many organizational boundaries (for example, to include allies). Connectivity is required within and among naval nodes,¹ and between both fixed installations and mobile Navy nodes and non-Navy locations worldwide. The non-Navy locations include other Services; other U.S. government installations, facilities, and nodes; Allied forces and locations; commercial and educational entities; and even hostile forces under some circumstances. This diversity is implied by the term *interoperable*. These connectivities require a wide range of attributes. They require varying levels of security, timeliness of connection establishment, timeliness of information transfer, duration requirements for the user–user interaction, robustness against unintentional or intentional disruption, information integrity or accuracy, and simultaneity (conferencing). The varying levels for the many attributes are not set uniquely for a given connectivity—several combinations may be required for any one connection, depending on the circumstances of the moment or on diverse needs of a user performing multiple activities.

Interoperability is critical. When the community of users extends beyond Navy boundaries, interoperability based on the standards of the larger community is required. Supporting interoperability demands the ability to exchange information and commands between users. This, in turn, places demands on all of the underlying procedures, processes, and hardware at every level. Interoperability implies a common (human or machine) language, common security methods and shared "keys," common protocols, and common modulation formats or methods. Where these items are not shared in common, translation mechanisms must be provided.

Now and for the foreseeable future, the number of possible connections and the capacities of those connections between mobile or deployable nodes will fall short of total user demands. Therefore, the command organization will have to allocate available resources to users based on mission and operational needs. Some resources needed to support Dynamic Interoperable Connectivity are inherently limited. Spectrum must be shared among surveillance (both active and passive); navigation; identification, friend or foe; communications; counter-C³; and weapons systems (soft-kill systems, in-flight missile guidance). Physical space for radios is limited, and today's radio systems (cryptographic device, modem, transmitter/receiver, antenna coupler, antenna) are usually dedicated to a single user or group. A goal for Dynamic Interoperable Connectivity at large nodes (ships, aircraft) is to eliminate dedicated equipment and spectrum. Reducing dedication of equipment and spectrum to single user classes will increase efficiency, expand the number and types of users having communications access at any given time, and reduce costs.

For very small nodes (miniature sensors, hand-held nodes), battery life is critical and energy consumption per bit delivered is a key characteristic. Universal access must be provided in a way that optimizes that characteristic.

¹ The term "node" is used to encompass manned and unmanned locations—including, for example, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and individual sensors.

UNIVERSAL INFORMATION ACCESS

A revolution in connectivity and distributed computer power is creating a potential for access to information that must be applied judiciously. Universal Information Access describes the interactive processes for information producers and information users (warfighters). The Universal Information Access imperative focuses on the warfighter's need for enough information to act appropriately, but not so much that confusion results. User pull is the "call for as needed" capability that allows the warfighter to access information, only as needed, based on changes in the operational situation. This capability requires robust information servers to support searching by forces deployed anywhere. Repositories of current, pertinent information, located at anchor desks, provide the warfighter with access to seek and receive the right information at the right time. In this paper we focus on information access by the warfighter (person), since machine information access is a subset—relying upon tools (such as intelligent agents) that could also be used by the warfighter.

The Universal Information Access imperative defines ways to meet user information needs for command and control at all levels. Warfighters must be able to access the universe of information without the need for specialized technical skills. The basic capabilities will consist of (1) user pull information transfer, (2) producer push, and (3) preplanned "information ordering."

User pull information transfer is a "call for as needed" capability allowing warfighters dynamic access to information according to mission situations. Warfighters of any rank will access the infosphere.

Producer push distributes information and alerts to customers, allowing command centers to inform and direct warfighters as needed whenever warfighters have insufficient knowledge or indications to formulate a request. Key to producer push is intelligent selection, or screening.

Preplanned information ordering has two components. First, preplanned essential information is assembled by the warfighter (at any command level) before a mission. Preplanned essential information comes from existing databases, which may be fixed in the sense that they are built and maintained independently of any specific mission. Second, information is updated as the mission requires by over-the-air updating.

User interaction is provided through (1) a *warfighter-computer interface*, (2) information assistants, and (3) information control. The warfighter-computer interface is broader in scope than a typical human-computer interface since the warfighter terminal must allow use by an automaton (an information agent) as well as by a human. The great volume of available information demands that warfighters have support in browsing, cataloging, and making sense of information—we call such support *information agents*. Such software assistants will use decision-support algorithms and artificial intelligence to help process the volume and diversity of the infosphere.

FOCUSED SENSING AND DATA COLLECTION

The developing concepts of a revolution in military affairs, or of network-centric warfare, or of operating inside an adversary's decision process, all assume availability of information upon which to base decisions and actions. Tactical decisions must be based on timely understanding, which, in turn, is based upon real-time data extracted from the area of interest.

In this imperative, *sensing* implies gathering data about the physical world through electromagnetic, acoustic/seismic, olfactory, or other measurement means. Sensing might be based on national or strategic systems including satellites and aircraft. It would include platform-based systems fielded on ships, aircraft, or unmanned vehicles. Finally, sensing might be based on deployed or dispersed tactical probes or sensor fields.

The concept of *focused* sensing implies concentration on things of interest, applying available sensing resources to obtain data and information on key subjects and areas. Focusing narrows the scope in one or more of the aspects of location, time, or type, where type refers to the events, features, or elements to be reported.

Data collection implies gathering data about the cyber world, or data about the physical world through means other than direct sensing. This would include extracting from electronic repositories, or manipulations of archived data.

The network-centric architecture extends to the sensor level. Networked sensors can collaborate to refine and enhance their data products. Some sensors will have the ability to act without real-time direction. This may involve refining their focus area, providing selective reports, or even relocating to areas of greater "interest." The primary objective is to provide the data needed by the user, who defines the focus.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS—ASSURANCE

In today's and tomorrow's world of asymmetric threats, protection of our information systems—and the network itself—is essential. Assurance in network-centric environments is less a feature of system operation than it is an empowerment of the users of these systems. Assurance features provide the access controls, authentication mechanisms, confidentiality, and integrity features that enable the users to assert their identity and to access resources in both peer–peer and client–server interactions. Assurance needs to be built into every aspect of a system in a consistent and correlated way. Piecework solutions or post-deployment appendages of assurance features are seldom successful or evolvable. The foundation of security is a clear definition of what is supposed to happen and who is supposed to perform that action. Given a clear definition of what services a system is supposed to offer and who is authorized to avail themselves of these services, assurance can be developed that these services are offered without modification, disclosure, or interruption, and that other unintended actions do not occur.

Assurance features that should be considered in the network-centric architecture include:

- Adaptation to protocol enhancement since reliance on specific protocol features can be short-lived and inflexible;
- Communication routing decisions should offer assurance of correctness. The exchange of routing information is critically important and must be communicated with assurance;
- Assurance features must support the delivery of information to multiple destinations;
- Assurance features must be designed to support joint mission execution and to support interactions with alliances of convenience;
- Interactions should be characterized as peer–peer or client–server, and

be provided. Special considerations must be made to provide services to remotely located users;

- Participants need to be identified in a consistent way throughout a system. A well-structured directory system is essential to coordinate these identifiers;
- Information should flow among people, while control flows should be contained within a site (i.e., the concept of a manager of managers is a bad idea);
- A small number of clearly defined categories of assured services should be supported. All applications that communicate must depend on one or more of these categories of services. Allowing applications to communicate in unique ways makes it very difficult to demonstrate system assurance.

Security services empower the user in the integrated interoperable distributed information sphere of the future—the network-centric architecture. The many aspects of assurance must be carefully crafted into the functional, operational, and structural aspects of information systems to serve future information warfighters.

RESOURCE PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT

Resource Planning and Management provides the tools necessary to identify and allocate resources for any given task or to meet an unplanned contingency. Such tools support effective use of limited resources including personnel, while requiring minimum manpower and skills for their use. Tools are not task-specific, and relate primarily to the planning for and allocation of C⁴ISR electromagnetic, information processing, information management, and personnel resources. Resource Planning and Management includes:

- Core services control, including self-diagnostics and healing, data storage and caching, and shared or distributed computing resources;
- The use of modeling and simulation in support of command and control;
- Decision support tools in support of focused logistics, including inventory control models, loss/damage models, and casualty models;
- Sensor tasking and collection management;
- Electromagnetic resources (antennas and other equipment; power levels; signal types and parameters; spectrum) "negotiator" —including communications resource management;
- Information management.

CONCLUSION

This paper is an attempt to identify the features of an architecture to support evolving and future network-centric operations. Recognizing these required features helps focus our energies on development of the enabling technologies to field the architecture.

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